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CONTENT MODERATION AND ADVERTISING IN SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS

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Content Moderation and Advertising in Social Media Platforms*

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On social media platforms, advertisers can be exposed to brand safety issues if they are associated with unsafe content. In this paper, we study the incentive of an ad-funded platform to curb the presence of unsafe content. Moderating unsafe content reduces the risk of advertiser presence on social media platforms, but it can change users’ participation on the platform and, in turn, affect advertisers’ monetization. This indirect “eyeball effect” can be either positive or negative and is key for the platform’s design of its content moderation policy. We identify conditions for the platform not to moderate unsafe content and demonstrate how the optimal moderation policy depends on the risk the advertisers face. We also study the intended and unintended effects of a policy that mandates social media platforms to moderate (more) unsafe content. We show that although it can benefit advertisers, users may be worse off because of the greater number of ads they are exposed to. Finally, we study how social media platform competition and the introduction of taxes on social media activity can distort the platform’s moderation strategies.

Keywords: Advertising; Content moderation; Social media platforms; Platforms.

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1 Introduction

Online activities represent a critical part of citizens’ lives today. In 2020, 4.14 billion people used social media platforms worldwide, with an annualized growth of more than 12% (DataReportal, 2020). Most of today’s activity is rooted in the production and diffusion of content that is essentially free from external validation, thus making it possible for inappropriate, harmful, and sometimes illegal material to be shared. Most social media platforms follow an ad-funded business model, and inappropriate material may adversely affect advertisers’ campaigns and cause brand safety issues.1

Concerns escalated in 2022 when Elon Musk, taking over Twitter, relaxed the platform’s content moderation policies. The world’s biggest media buyer, GroupM, classified Twitter as a “high-risk platform” for brands2 and many luxury brands (e.g., Balenciaga) either paused their ad purchases or quit the platform3. Similar concerns had emerged against YouTube in 2018, resulting in the exodus of advertisers (the so-called “Adpocalypse”)4. Likewise, Facebook was accused of failing to create a safe environment for advertisers. Figure 1 provides an example of such a case, where an ad for the luxury holiday operator Sandals was displayed next to a video featuring terrorist propaganda on YouTube.

This paper studies the incentive of a social media platform to design its content moderation policy and advertising strategies. We build on the workhorse model of two-sided markets (Rochet and Tirole 2003) where a social media platform mediates interactions between users who consume online content free of charge and advertisers who pay for ad campaigns. The platform hosts safe and unsafe — but not manifestly unlawful — material, with the latter entailing brand safety issues that render advertising via the social media platform less appealing vis-à-vis their outside option (of advertising via cable TV). Unlike advertisers, users may prefer or have an aversion to unsafe content.5 In the former case, advertisers’ and users’ preferences

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1Ada et al. (2022) show, for example, that advertisers are willing to bid more if they are aware of the information context in which their ads will appear. Similarly, Devaux (2023) studies the importance of a good match between ads and content to induce a higher click-through-rate. Shehu et al. (2020) reveal that the success of a brand campaign may depend on the quality of its context, especially for premium brands. Brand safety can be defined as “the set of measures that aim to protect the brand’s image from the negative or harmful influence of inappropriate or questionable content on the publisher’s site where the ad impression is served” (See Smartyads.com for a definition).

2See Digiday.com, November 14, 2022, ‘The world’s biggest media buyer GroupM is telling advertisers that Twitter is a high-risk media buy’.

3See Grid.news, November 15, 2022, ‘Internal Twitter documents show the scope of advertisers’ questions about Elon Musk’s policies’.


5Unsafe or toxic content can have a positive effect on user engagement, which stimulates participation on a platform (Beknazaryuzbashchev et al., 2022). Moreover, users might like the presence of potentially unsafe content for advertisements but non-toxic for themselves. For example, in 2019, the micro-blogging platform Tumblr lost nearly 30 percent of its traffic and almost 99 percent of its market value after banning porn in late 2018. Such a ban was designed to keep “content that is not brand-safe away from ads”. See The Verge, March 14, 2019, ‘After the porn ban, Tumblr users have ditched the platform as promised’.
are congruent, whereas in the latter case, their preferences are conflicting.\footnote{We focus on unsafe content, but there exists a broad class of content that are safe but potentially harmful to brand reputation. For example, DoubleVerify (see April 25, 2018, ‘A Call for Brand Safety in the Social Media Landscape’), a company working in the media sector to make advertising safe, offers solutions to brands to monitor against eleven types of content, including aviation disasters, violence, hate speech, man-made and natural disasters, pornography, profanity, substance abuse, terrorist events, and weapons and vehicle disasters.}

Our first result relates to the effect of content moderation on the level of advertiser participation and the platform’s incentives to curb the presence of unsafe content. For a given price, a higher content moderation intensity has two effects on advertisers: it makes the social media environment safer (brand safety effect), and it repels (respectively, attracts) users who are interested in consuming unsafe (respectively, safe) content (eyeball effect). Because the platform generates revenues on the advertiser side only, the social media platform internalizes the effect that a higher content moderation intensity has on advertisers. Despite the presence of unsafe content, we identify sufficient conditions for which the platform finds it optimal not to moderate at all. This happens if users have a strong preference for the presence of unsafe content and if advertisers’ marginal reputation loss from being associated with such content is limited.

For our second result, we identify the equilibrium advertising price and content moderation strategy using a model that, for simplicity, relies on a uniform distribution of the outside options of advertisers and users. We study how the platform decision depends on the reputation loss advertisers would face if they were exposed to unsafe content. We show how content moderation plays a fundamental role in users’ demand. If the (marginal) moderation cost is low enough, the platform finds it not too costly to accommodate advertisers’ requests for a safer environment; therefore, its optimal content moderation choice increases with reputation loss associated with unsafe unmoderated content. Interestingly, the optimal ad price follows is U-shaped in the size of reputation loss associated with unmoderated unsafe content to reflect the social media
platform’s marginal gains from moderation. If the (marginal) moderation cost is sufficiently high, any change in content moderation intensity is costly for the platform. We find that the optimal moderation policy is bell-shaped in the reputation loss associated with unmoderated unsafe content reflecting the platform’s marginal gain from moderation. As advertisers’ utility decreases faster, the larger their reputation loss, the optimal ad price decreases in the magnitude of the reputation loss.

The third result concerns the intended and unintended effects of mandating platforms with a stricter content moderation policy. For example, the Digital Services Act, which became law in 2022, identifies obligations for large online platforms relative to the presence of illegally produced, uploaded, or sold material while safeguarding freedom of speech. In Germany, the 2017 Network Enforcement Act (NetzDG) obligates platforms to remove unlawful content quickly. We, therefore, study the effects of a mandated content moderation policy that induces the platform to raise its moderation intensity above its privately optimal level. We show that the policy induces the platform to react strategically by raising the ad price. Nevertheless, we find that, in the presence of a uniformly distributed opportunity cost of advertisers, the direct effect of a higher moderation intensity compensates for the loss resulting from a price increase. Although advertisers are better off with a mandated content moderation policy, the effect on user surplus and participation is less straightforward because of two potentially opposite effects. First, users benefit (respectively, suffer) from reducing unsafe content depending on whether they like (respectively dislike) unsafe content. Second, users are exposed to a larger number of ads that generate a nuisance cost. The net effect is overall negative if users prefer or do not dislike “too much” the presence of unsafe content. This result has implications for designing optimal regulation of content moderation.

We further extend our analysis in two dimensions. First, we study how platform competition affects the decision of social media platforms. We build on a Hotelling setting with two symmetric social media platforms, singlehoming users, and multihoming advertisers. We show that as competition for user attention intensifies, attracting users becomes more salient for the ad-funded business of the platform, and the platform can employ two complementary instruments: controlling the number of ads via the pricing instrument and writing content moderation policies. We show that fiercer competition tends to induce social media platforms to adopt lax content moderation. Second, we consider the effect of taxing a social media platform to let it (better) internalize the presence of unsafe content and raise its content moderation intensity. However, in multi-sided markets, interdependence across sides can lead to substantial changes in the business strategies employed by the platform’s owner (Belleflamme and Toulemonde, 2018; Bourreau et al., 2018; Kind et al., 2010, 2013; Kind and Koethenbuerger, 2018; Tremblay, 2018). We show that a tax based on the number of users or a tax based on advertising

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revenues induces the platform to bias its strategy toward the opposite side of the market. Taxing advertising revenues reduces the platform’s marginal gains from content moderation; thus, it unintentionally lowers the content moderation intensity. In contrast, taxing platforms based on their user size can have ambiguous results on the platform’s incentive to moderate unsafe content.

Finally, we discuss some implications for advertisers, brands, and platforms’ owners. We also present implications for policymakers willing to ensure that social media platforms fulfill some social responsibilities when unsafe material circulates within their ecosystem.

The paper unfolds as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the related literature. In Section 3, we present the model setup. In Section 4, we present the analysis of the baseline model. In Section 5, we study the effect of mandating stricter content moderation on social media platforms’ strategy, advertisers, and users’ surplus. In Section 6, we extend the model to platform competition. In Section 7, we present a few extensions and applications of our insights to other intermediaries dealing with advertisers. Section 8 provides concluding remarks.

2 Related Literature

Despite recent regulations for online intermediaries (e.g., EU Digital Services Act) and discussions among the marketer’s community (e.g., the Adpocalypse on YouTube), research on platforms’ incentives to moderate unsafe content is still limited. 8 The closest paper to ours is that of Liu et al. (2022) and Jiménez Durán (2022). Liu et al. (2022) study content moderation and technology adoption in a social media platform in the presence of user taste heterogeneity. They show that when a platform finds it optimal to moderate content, a revenue model based on advertising produces more extreme content than a revenue model based on subscription. The opposite emerges when the platform does not moderate content. We differ from their study in that we explicitly model the advertisers’ side of the market, whose activity level depends on the platform’s content moderation policy and pricing strategy. Because users dislike ads, a see-saw effect between the two sides of the market can lead to a reduction of user participation (and surplus) even if the platform moderates unsafe content and both advertisers and users prefer moderation. Liu et al. also focuses on the revenue

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8 Exceptions are Chen et al. (2011), Casner (2020), Teh (2022), and Jeon et al. (2021). Chen et al. (2011) study how moderation of user-generated content affects creators’ incentives to produce high-quality content. Casner (2020) and Teh (2022), focus on platform governance and screening as an instrument to control competition among sellers. We add to these studies by identifying the social media platform incentives and the indirect effect that a mandated screening policy has on the platform’s pricing instrument. Jeon et al. (2021) study the incentive of a marketplace platform to screen out IP-infringing products and the intended and unintended effects of introducing a liability regime for online intermediaries that induces more screening. They identify conditions for higher screening to negatively affect brand owners’ innovation incentives and social welfare.
model and its impact on content moderation. We instead focus on the interplay between ad prices and content moderation and how this richer set of instruments allows the platform to win advertisers.

Jiménez Durán (2022) studies the incentives of social media platforms to ban users and remove toxic content. The platform monetizes users’ eyeballs with ads and trade-offs between users’ engagement and both safe and unsafe content. As a result, the platform moderates toxic content to the extent to which it raises advertising revenues. This mechanism is akin to ours, although we micro-found advertising revenues by endogenizing user and advertising decisions to the platform. In two field experiments run on Twitter, Jiménez Durán (2022) looks at the effect of moderating hate speech on user surplus and finds no significant effect, which the author rationalizes in terms of users ignoring the potential side effects of hate speech.

Jiménez Durán et al. (2022), and Beknazard-Yuzbashev et al. (2022) study the effects of enforcing stricter content moderation on online and offline hate crime on content consumption, respectively. Jiménez Durán et al. investigate how the introduction of Germany’s NetzDG regulation, equivalent to imposing stricter content moderation intensity, influenced offline and online hatred targeting minorities. They show that the regulation had a statistically significant negative effect on toxic posts by far-right social media users and on crime against refugees in those areas more exposed to the effects of the policy. Beknazard-Yuzbashev et al. run a field experiment on Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, showing that toxic content drives user engagement. The authors show that a platform faces a trade-off between reducing the extent to which toxic content is displayed to users and lowering content consumption, which can be monetized with ads.

More broadly, this paper adds to the literature on user-generated content and media outlet provision (Yildirim et al., 2013; Zhang and Sarvary, 2014; Luca, 2015; de Corniere and Sarvary, 2023). We relate to this literature in that we study the harm that online content can cause to advertisers and how it impacts platform governance. Our paper also relates to recent studies looking at information-sharing behavior and algorithmic curation (Abreu and Jeon, 2020; Acemoglu et al., 2021; Berman and Katona, 2020; Kranton and McAdams, 2020; Mueller-Frank et al., 2022). Whereas these papers consider platform strategies and the diffusion of news, we focus instead on the strategies employed by social media platforms to control the quality dimension of the content.

Finally, this paper connects with the literature on media bias, which has dealt with news bias originating in the supply and demand sides of the market. The former deals with a bias formed by advertisers, political orientation, government, and lobbies (see, e.g., Besley and Prat 2006; Ellman and Germano 2009). The latter depends on the beliefs of the targeted audience (see, e.g., Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005; Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006; Xiang and Sarvary 2007; Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005; Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006; Xiang and Sarvary 2007; Xiang and Sarvary 2007; Xiang and Sarvary 2007).

9More broadly, the paper is also related to the literature on user-generated content, although we do not model the creation of content explicitly by users.
Gal-Or et al. 2012). In this literature, a content provider determines the news distortion. In our framework, the platform does not influence the direction of the bias, but it can exercise moderation to safeguard advertisers. To this end, it trades the benefits of ensuring a higher brand safety to advertisers with costly effort and the potential demand contraction from users. This aspect allows us to differentiate from these studies. For example, Ellman and Germano (2009) investigated media bias in a market where platforms sell content to readers and profit from advertisers. In their framework, platforms can influence the accuracy of news and generate a better match with ads. Our article underlines a similar mechanism regarding the impact of harmful content on the platform’s profit. In this case, the platform might influence that match by moderating content more or less carefully.

Our results on platform competition and content moderation are reminiscent of Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005), who found that newspaper competition leads to a more considerable media bias. Like ours, Gal-Or et al. (2012) studied the competition between ad-based media outlets in the presence of heterogeneous readers and endogenous homing decisions of advertisers. The authors showed that the presence of advertisers creates incentives for content moderation, which results in a higher ad price. However, when advertisers single-home, media outlets become a bottleneck, and competition intensifies, resulting in further slanting and polarization of readers. In our model, when competition intensifies, the platform might become more tolerant of unsafe material depending on user preferences for moderation.

3 The Model

We consider a monopolist social media platform that connects users who consume all available content on the platform, and advertisers who run an advertising campaign on behalf of third-party brands. We assume that content creators exogenously develop content on the platform, which can be either safe or unsafe.\(^\text{10}\)

The mass of safe content is normalized to 1, whereas the mass of unsafe content is equal to \(\theta(m) \in [0, 1]\), where \(m \in [0, 1]\) is the content moderation policy of the platform, and \(\theta(0) = 1\), \(\theta(1) = 0\), and \(\theta'(0) < 0\). We assume that \(\theta(m)\) is continuous and differentiable.

The platform. The platform generates revenues by charging an advertising price \(p\) to advertisers that have joined the website, whose mass is denoted by \(a\). The profit of the platform, net of the moderation cost \(C(m)\), is defined as

\[
\Pi(a, m) := ap - C(m). \quad (1)
\]

\(^{10}\)Viral content is generated by a handful of popular content creators (e.g., famous YouTubers and influencers on Instagram), and there is a long tail of creators with limited views. On YouTube, content creators monetize views only if they have reached at least 1,000 subscribers and have streamed at least 4,000 hours in the past 12 months. See YouTube, January 16, 2018, 'Additional changes to YouTube partner'.
We assume that the moderation cost is sufficiently convex, with \( C(0) = 0, C'(0) = 0, C'(\cdot) > 0, \) and \( C''(m) > 0. \) This reflects that the stricter the content moderation policy, the more attention is devoted to more controversial content (such as conspiracy theories or hate speech) that requires higher investments or costly technology, that could take the form of text analysis, or ex-post human verification. Moreover, we assume that the profit function of the platform is concave in both its arguments.

**Internet users.** A mass of Internet users is heterogeneous in their opportunity cost of joining the social media platform, which we denote by \( \xi \) and assumed to be uniformly distributed on \([0, \xi]\). When joining the platform, a user obtains an intrinsic benefit \( u > 0 \) from the presence of safe content and a benefit or loss \( \phi \) from unsafe content. We distinguish between two cases. In the first one, users benefit from the presence of unsafe content, \( \phi = \phi^+ > 0, \) and therefore have conflicting preferences to those of advertisers. In the second one, users obtain a disutility from the presence of unsafe content, \( \phi = \phi^- < 0, \) and therefore have congruent preferences to those of advertisers. We assume that all users are homogeneous in \( \phi, \) and we distinguish between the two cases. Users join the platform free of charge but are exposed to a number of ads, \( a. \) As in Anderson and Coate (2005), we assume that users face a nuisance cost from advertising on the social media platform and we denote as \( \gamma > 0 \) the per-unit nuisance cost. The utility of a user that joins the platform is

\[
U(a, m) := u \times \frac{1}{\theta(m)} + \phi \times \theta(m) - \gamma \times a
\]  

(2)

The number of users who join the platform is denoted by \( n. \)

**Advertisers.** There is a mass of advertisers who are heterogeneous in their outside option \( \omega \) (e.g., advertising via cable TV for example), which is uniformly distributed on \([0, \omega]\). Each advertiser runs at most one ad campaign upon joining the platform and pays the advertising price \( p. \) We assume that each ad is displayed only once to users on the platform. For a given mass of users \( n \) on the platform, advertisers obtain revenues \( rn \) where \( r \) reflects the advertiser’s revenues per impression. We capture the negative effect of unsafe content on advertisers — brand safety issues — by assuming that their presence renders them less appealing to the social media platform than their outside options. Specifically, the marginal loss for unsafe content— a measure of the brand risk associated with the presence of unsafe content on the platform— is denoted by \( \lambda > 0, \) which we assume to be exogenously given and homogenous across advertisers.

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11Our insights would not change qualitatively if we were to consider two groups that only differ in their preferences for unsafe content. The optimal strategy of the platform would then depend on the preferences of the largest consumer group. The main results may differ if one group of consumers only has preferences for unsafe content and the other group of consumers benefits from the presence of safe content and suffers from the presence of unsafe content.
The utility of an advertiser that runs its campaign on the platform is

\[ V(m, p) := \underbrace{r \times n}_{\text{revenues per impression}} - \underbrace{\lambda \times \theta(m)}_{\text{reputation loss}} - p. \]  

(3)

**Timing.** The timing of the game is as follows. In the first stage \((t = 1)\), the social media platform decides its ad price, \(p > 0\), and the content moderation policy, \(m \in [0, 1]\). In the second stage, users and advertisers form fulfilled expectations regarding the number of advertisers and users joining the social media platform.

### 4 Analysis

This section outlines a potential trade-off between access to a broader audience and brand safety. Then, we solve the model to identify the platform’s equilibrium price and content moderation.

#### 4.1 A simple trade-off for advertisers and the platform

As discussed, advertisers recently raised several concerns about the lax content moderation policy that major platforms carry out. Yet, stricter content moderation may not necessarily benefit advertisers. To understand why, let us first determine the level of activity on the platform for a given price. Denoting \(F(\cdot)\) and \(H(\cdot)\) (respectively, \(f(\cdot)\) and \(h(\cdot)\)) the cdf (respectively, pdf) of the two independent random variables \(\xi\) and \(\omega\), respectively, the masses of users and advertisers are probabilities such that \(a(n, m, p) = \Pr(V \geq 0) = H(rn(a, m) - \lambda \theta(m) - p)\) and \(n(a, m) = \Pr(U \geq 0) = F(u + \phi \theta(m) - \gamma a(n, m, p))\).

Due to the feedback loop between users and advertisers, it is useful to solve for a fixed point. We can write the two masses respectively as a sole function of \(\{m, p\}\):

\[ a(m, p) = H(rF(u + \phi \theta(m) - \gamma a(m, p)) - \lambda(m) - p) \]

\[ n(m, p) = F(u + \phi \theta(m) - \gamma H(rn(m, p) - \lambda(m) - p)) \]

Differentiating \(a(m, p)\) with respect to \(m\), we have \(\frac{da(m, p)}{dm} = \frac{dH(\cdot)}{dm}\). Dropping the arguments for ease of notation yields

\[ \frac{dH(\cdot)}{dm} = -\lambda \theta'(m) h(\cdot) + h(\cdot) rf(\cdot) \left( \phi \theta'(m) - \frac{dH(\cdot)}{dm} \right) \]

\[ = \frac{h(\cdot) \theta'(m) \left( rf(\cdot) \phi - \lambda \right)}{1 + \gamma rf(\cdot) h(\cdot)} \]
The sign of \( \frac{da(m,p)}{dm} \) depends on two main components. First, a (positive) brand safety effect because a higher moderation intensity reduces the advertisers’ reputation loss of being associated with unsafe content. Second, an eyeball effect is associated with a change in user demand. The sign of this effect is captured by \( rf(\cdot) \phi \) and depends on whether \( \phi \) is positive or negative. In other words, a stricter moderation policy can lead to more or fewer users’ participation on the platform depending on whether they draw positive utility \( (\phi = \phi^+) \) or suffer \( (\phi = \phi^-) \) from the presence of unsafe content on the platform. In the former case, the eyeball effect is positive, which is sufficient to ensure that more advertisers will join the platform. In the latter case, the eyeball effect is negative, which means that the audience and the reputation of the advertisers have a trade-off. The net effect is positive (respectively, negative) if the brand safety effect is more prominent (respectively, less) than the eyeball effect.

The following lemma presents conditions for an increase in \( m \) to raise the participation level of advertisers to the platform.

**Lemma 1.** For any given price, stricter content moderation leads to more advertising if \( \lambda > rf(\cdot) \phi \).

The trade-off between reaching a broader audience and keeping advertisers safe is also in the social media platform. For a given price, differentiating the platform’s profit with respect to \( m \) yields

\[
\frac{\partial \Pi(m, p)}{\partial m} = p \frac{da(m, p)}{dm} - C'(m) = p \frac{dH(\cdot)}{dm} - C'(m)
\]

It follows that the platform does not have any incentive to engage in content moderation if the preceding first-order condition is negative at \( m = 0 \). This case arises if \( \frac{da(m,p)}{dm} < 0 \) that is, if \( \lambda < rf(\cdot) \phi \), which is only possible if users’ preferences strongly conflict with those of advertisers. The intuition is that, in this case, because the platform needs users to attract advertisers and monetize eyeballs, it has to sacrifice advertisers’ safety.

In all other cases, the platform’s content moderation policy, defined at equilibrium as \( m^* \), is in \((0, 1]\). The intuition is quite simple: for a given price, the platform has the incentive to moderate (at least partially) unsafe content as long as this brings additional advertising revenues. The following proposition summarizes this discussion.

**Proposition 1.** For any given positive ad price, if \( \lambda < rf(\cdot) \phi \), the platform does not moderate unsafe content and chooses \( m^* = 0 \). In all other cases, the platform’s moderation policy is \( m^* \in (0, 1] \).

This result holds for any general function. In the next section, we characterize the platform’s optimal ad price and moderation policy by relying on a uniform distribution of the outside options of the advertisers and users.

\[ \text{12} \] A sufficient condition for \( \frac{dH(\cdot)}{dm} > 0 \) is that \( rf(\cdot) \phi - \lambda < 0 \), which is always the case if \( \phi < 0 \).
4.2 Analysis with a uniform distribution

We have outlined how the platform can set its moderation policy by deriving its first-order condition with respect to \( m \) for a given price. Because decisions on the ad price and content moderation are made simultaneously, we make the following assumptions to obtain a closed-form solution:

\[
\xi \sim U[0, 1] \quad \omega \sim U[0, 1] \quad (A1) \\
C(m) = \frac{cm^2}{2}, \quad c > \frac{(\lambda - \phi r)^2}{2(\gamma r + 1)} \quad (A2) \\
\theta(m) = 1 - m \quad (A3)
\]

(A1) defines the support of the outside options of users and advertisers, which are uniformly distributed in \([0, 1]\). This means that \( f(\cdot) \) and \( h(\cdot) \) are equal to 1. (A2) states that the moderation cost is quadratic and \( c \), the cost parameter, is sufficiently high to ensure that the platform’s profit is concave in both \( m \) and \( p \). (A3) implies that the amount of unsafe content decreases linearly with the moderation intensity of the platform.

The program of the platform under assumptions (A1-A3) is

\[
\max_{m, p} \Pi(m, p) = p \times a(m, p) - C(m) = p \times \frac{ru - p - (1 - m)(\lambda - r\phi)}{1 + \gamma r} - \frac{cm^2}{2}
\]

The following corollary presents the equilibrium ad price and content moderation from the simultaneous decision of the platform.

**Corollary 1.** Under Assumptions (A1-A3), the platform sets the following content moderation policy and price:

(i) If \( \lambda \leq \phi r \):

\[
m^* = 0 \quad p^* = \frac{ru + \lambda}{2}.
\]

(ii) If \( \phi r < \lambda < \phi r + \frac{2c(\gamma r + 1)}{ru} \):

\[
m^* = \frac{(\lambda - r\phi)(ru + \phi) - \lambda}{2c(\gamma r + 1) - (\lambda - r\phi)^2} \in (0, 1) \quad p^* = \frac{c(\gamma r + 1)(ru + \phi) - \lambda}{2c(\gamma r + 1) - (\lambda - r\phi)^2}.
\]

(iii) If \( \lambda \geq \phi r + \frac{2c(\gamma r + 1)}{ru} \):

\[
m^* = 1 \quad p^* = \frac{ru}{2}.
\]

If consumers have conflicting preferences for content moderation and the marginal reputation loss of advertisers for being associated with unsafe content is low enough, the platform moderates no content. As consumers gain from the presence of unsafe content, advertisers’ price increases in \( \phi \). Also, as more users join the platform, the eyeball effect grows larger than the
brand safety effect. An interior moderation level is present for $\phi_r < \lambda < \phi_r + \frac{2c(\gamma r + 1)}{ru}$, a case that exists both when preferences are congruent and when they are conflicting. In this case, the risk carried out by the presence of unsafe content is more significant for advertisers. Therefore, increasing the intensity of content moderation positively affects advertisers’ participation and the platform’s monetization incentives. Thus, the platform finds it optimal to engage in a partial content moderation $m^* \in (0, 1)$. Finally, the platform finds it optimal to engage in full content moderation if advertisers’ losses from their association with unsafe content are large enough. Interestingly, the ad price becomes independent of users’ preferences for moderation and only reflects the economic value $ru$ attached to safe content. In the rest of the analysis, we focus on the most interesting case: partial content moderation of unsafe content, i.e., $m^*(0, 1)$.

**How does brand risk affects the platform’s strategy?** To better understand how the optimal price and the moderation strategy of the platform depend on the advertisers’ aversion to unsafe content, in what follows, we perform simple comparative statics of $m^*$ and $p^*$ with respect to $\lambda$, the marginal reputation loss associated with the presence of unsafe content. We restrict our attention to (ii) in Corollary 1 therefore focusing on the interior content moderation solution.

Differentiating (4) with respect to $\lambda$ yields

$$
\frac{\partial p^*}{\partial \lambda} \bigg|_{\phi_r < \lambda < \phi_r + \frac{2c(\gamma r + 1)}{ru}} = \frac{c(\gamma r + 1)((\lambda - r\phi)(r(2u + \phi) - \lambda) - 2c(\gamma r + 1))}{(2c(\gamma r + 1) - (\lambda - r\phi)^2)^2}
$$

$$
\frac{\partial m^*}{\partial \lambda} \bigg|_{\phi_r < \lambda < \phi_r + \frac{2c(\gamma r + 1)}{ru}} = \frac{ru(2c(\gamma r + 1) + (\lambda - r\phi)^2) - 4c(\gamma r + 1)(\lambda - r\phi)}{(2c(\gamma r + 1) - (\lambda - r\phi)^2)^2}
$$

The sign of the effect of $\lambda$ on the ad price is the same as the sign of

$$
\frac{(\lambda - r\phi)(r(2u + \phi) - \lambda) - 2c(\gamma r + 1)}{(+)} \quad \frac{-4c(\gamma r + 1)(\lambda - r\phi)}{(-)}
$$

Two opposite effects are at play. First, an increase in the marginal reputation loss for advertisers, $\lambda$, has a positive effect on the marginal gains of the platform from raising content moderation. Therefore, the platform tends to increase the price. Second, a negative effect is associated with the cost of content moderation. Thus, a threshold value of $c$ exists below (respectively, above) which raising $\lambda$ has a positive (respectively, negative) effect on the ad price.

The sign of the effect of $\lambda$ on the moderation level is the same as the sign of

$$
\frac{ru(2c(\gamma r + 1) + (\lambda - r\phi)^2) - 4c(\gamma r + 1)(\lambda - r\phi)}{(+)} \quad \frac{-2c(\gamma r + 1)}{(-)}
$$
Two opposite effects occur: a positive force associated with the gains from moderation (and users’ participation) and a negative force associated with its cost. The net effect depends on the marginal moderation cost, and there exists a critical value of $c$ above (respectively, below) which the effect is positive (respectively, negative).

In the Appendix, we show that the critical value of $c$ is the same in the two cases, and we denote it as $\tilde{c} := \frac{(ur)^2}{2(r+1)}$. The following proposition summarizes the above discussion.

**Proposition 2.** Under Assumptions (A1-A3), for any $\phi r < \lambda < \phi r + \frac{2c(r+1)}{ru}$, a higher $\lambda$ has the following effects on the equilibrium price and content moderation intensity:

- if $c \leq \tilde{c}$, then $p^*$ is U-shaped in $\lambda$ and $m^*$ increases in $\lambda$.
- if $c > \tilde{c}$, then $m^*$ is inverted-U shaped in $\lambda$ and $p^*$ decreases in $\lambda$.

This proposition can be explained easily with the aid of Figure 2 and 3, which indicate that the equilibrium content moderation policy of the platform is concave in $\lambda$, whereas the equilibrium price is convex in $\lambda$. If $c$ is sufficiently low, the platform finds adjusting its content moderation policy to be relatively cheaper, because any marginal increase in the intensity of content moderation does not cost much. In this case, the higher the moderation policy the platform chooses, the larger the loss advertisers face when exposed to unsafe content. However, the price is U-shaped. The intuition is as follows: for a (relatively) low $\lambda$, the loss associated with unsafe content is low for advertisers, meaning that the marginal gain from higher moderation is small and insufficient to attract more advertisers. As a result, the platform uses the pricing instrument to attract advertisers, lowering the ad price. For a (relatively) high $\lambda$, the loss associated with unsafe content is high for advertisers. This means that marginal gains from moderation are higher for the platform when advertisers benefit more from a safer environment. As a result, the platform can extract greater surplus by raising the price.

If $c$ is sufficiently high, any marginal increase in content moderation intensity is expensive for the platform. Due to the concavity of $m^*$ in $\lambda$, the platform raises its content moderation intensity only when this loss faced by advertisers is low because it would be too costly to offset advertisers’ losses if these are high. Because advertisers’ losses increase faster than potential gains from a higher content moderation intensity, the platform finds it optimal to lower its price.

These results apply regardless of whether users and advertisers have congruent or conflicting preferences. Yet, the nature of their preferences matters for determining the parameter ranges in which the different effects identified are present.

Moreover, we note that network externalities in our framework are particularly important because they generate countervailing incentives for the platform. To see why, suppose users do not encounter a disutility from the presence of ads, that is, $\gamma = 0$. Our analysis suggests that
without advertising nuisance, the platform would have a higher incentive to attract advertisers and, therefore, moderate content, all else being equal. This would lead to a higher price and a higher content moderation intensity.

5 Mandated Content Moderation

In this section, we study the potential unintended effects of inducing online intermediaries to invest more in content moderation (e.g., Germany’s NetzDG).\textsuperscript{13} We assume that a regulator or an ad hoc authority obliges online intermediaries to attain a minimum level of content moderation, which we denote as $\hat{m}$. We focus on the scenario in which $m^* < \hat{m}$ so that the constraint is binding for the platform. Because the platform is constrained in the content

\textsuperscript{13}Previous empirical and theoretical studies that have focused on policy intervention have mostly dealt with platform’s incentives and copyright-infringing content (Tunca and Wu, 2013; Aguiar et al., 2018; Jain et al., 2020; De Chiara et al., 2021)
moderation decision, the only strategic variable is price. To understand the direction of the strategic response of the platform, we differentiate \( p^\star \) and \( a(p^\star, m) \) with respect to \( m \). Under Assumptions (A1-A3), we have

\[
\frac{dp^\star}{dm} = \frac{\lambda}{2} - \frac{\phi r}{2} > 0, \quad \frac{da(m, p^\star)}{dm} = \frac{dp^\star}{dm} \left(1 + \gamma r\right) > 0. \tag{5}
\]

for any \( \lambda > \phi r \).\(^{14}\) Therefore, mandated content moderation affords the platform to raise the ad price. Because a higher content moderation intensity leads to a higher utility for advertisers due to the reduced risk associated with unsafe content, the platform finds it optimal to increase its ad price. Importantly, under a uniform distribution, the price increase is less than the increase in the utility of the advertisers. As a result, the platform has more advertising.

**Proposition 3.** Under Assumptions (A1-A3), inducing the platform to raise its content moderation intensity above \( m^\star \) leads to a higher ad price \( p^\star \) and a higher number of ads \( a(m, p^\star) \) displayed to users.

This proposition also suggests that, by revealed preferences, advertisers are better off with mandated content moderation. However, this may not necessarily be the case for the platform’s users. This is because a higher moderation intensity has two effects on users. First, a positive or negative direct effect occurs because a higher moderation can benefit or harm consumers depending on whether they draw utility or suffer from the presence of unsafe content. Second, a negative indirect effect occurs because a higher moderation intensity leads to more ads and is a greater nuisance to users. Formally,

\[
\frac{dn(m, p^\star)}{dm} = -\frac{\phi(2 + \gamma r)}{2(1 + \gamma r)} - \frac{\lambda \gamma}{2(1 + \gamma r)}.
\tag{6}
\]

Immediately, a sufficient condition for mandated content moderation to be detrimental to consumers is \( \phi > 0 \), which occurs if users enjoy unsafe content. However, if users dislike unsafe content and have congruent preferences, they face a trade-off between a relatively higher nuisance from ads and a relatively lower presence of unsafe content. The net effect is positive (respectively, negative) if the increase in the nuisance is less than the gain from a safer platform environment. We summarize this discussion in the following proposition.

**Proposition 4.** Under Assumptions (A1-A3), inducing the platform to raise its content moderation intensity above \( m^\star \) increases user participation only if users’ aversion to unsafe content is sufficiently strong:

\[
-\phi > \frac{\lambda \gamma}{(2 + \gamma r)}.
\]

\(^{14}\)If \( \lambda < \phi r \), \( m^\star = 0 \) and there is no strategic response by the platform.
In all remaining cases, user participation decreases with a higher content moderation intensity.

This analysis identifies potential unintended (negative) consequences for users when a mandated content moderation policy is imposed. Suppose users and advertisers have congruent preferences, with users suffering significantly from the presence of unsafe content (i.e., $-\phi > \frac{\lambda \gamma}{(2+\gamma r)}$). Then, inducing the platform to raise its content moderation intensity leads to increased participation on both sides of the market. By revealed preferences, advertisers’ and users’ surplus increases, but the platform is weakly worse off because it is forced to choose a sub-optimal content moderation policy. Suppose now that users and advertisers have conflicting preferences or that users suffer only slightly from the presence of unsafe content (i.e., $-\phi < \frac{\lambda \gamma}{(2+\gamma r)}$). In this case, there is a trade-off for policymakers on the impact of mandated content moderation on surplus reallocation across sides. A higher content moderation intensity would lead to more advertisers and fewer users and it would negatively affect the platform’s profit. The following proposition provides a summary of this discussion.

**Proposition 5.** Under Assumptions (A1-A3), increasing content moderation intensity above $m^*$ generates a trade-off between users, advertisers, and the platform. In all other cases, the trade-off is between benefits for advertisers and losses for users and the platform.

This analysis identifies unintended (negative) consequences for users when a mandated content moderation policy is imposed. To shed light on possible interventions that a regulator, or more generally, lawmakers, can make, we consider two polar cases in which the platform is obliged either to moderate all unsafe content or not to engage in moderation at (unless the material is manifestly unlawful). Using previous results, we state the following.

15Restricting our attention to a mandated content moderation that raises $m$ in the neighborhood of $m^*$, such that $\frac{\partial H(m, p^*)}{\partial m}|_{m=m^*} = 0$, is certainly socially desirable.

16For example, $\hat{m} = 0$ is consistent with a radical form of freedom of speech and any form of automatic monitoring is prohibited.
Proposition 6. Suppose \( \hat{m} \) is either 0 or 1

(i) \( \hat{m} = 1 \) is preferred by users and advertisers over \( \hat{m} = 0 \) in the presence of congruent tastes for moderation only if \( \phi \) is sufficiently negative. In all other cases, users always prefer \( \hat{m} = 0 \), whereas advertisers always prefer \( \hat{m} = 1 \).

(ii) A platform’s profit is higher with \( \hat{m} = 1 \) only if the (marginal) moderation cost is sufficiently small.

The proof can intuitively follow from (5). Between the two extreme cases, the outright removal of all unsafe content is only desirable for advertisers and users if their preferences are congruent and gains for users resulting from a reduction of unsafe material more than compensate for the higher ad nuisance. Otherwise, users are better off with no moderation, which generates brand safety issues for advertisers.

Comparing the profit of the platform in the two scenarios, we observe that

\[
\Pi(\hat{m} = 1) - \Pi(\hat{m} = 0) \geq 0 \quad \text{if} \quad c \leq \frac{(\lambda - \phi r)(2ru - (\lambda - \phi r))}{2(1 + \gamma r)}
\]

Interestingly, there are conditions for which the platform finds it optimal to remove all unsafe content. Specifically, the platform is better off completely removing unsafe content if more moderation triggers a demand expansion on the user side that largely offsets the high cost of moderation. In all other cases, the removal of all unsafe content could adversely impact the overall welfare.

6 Platform Competition

Social media platforms compete with one another by providing differentiated services. For example, Instagram competes for user attention against TikTok and Snapchat. In this section, we extend our analysis to competing platforms to study how, in a simplified setting with symmetric social media platforms, content moderation policies are chosen and these are affected by the intensity of competition between platforms. We build on a standard Hotelling model, with platforms at the endpoints (0 and 1) of a line of unit length. We focus on a competitive bottleneck setting: users only join one platform, whereas advertisers multi-home on both platforms. Platform \( i = 1, 2 \) maximizes profits by choosing its content moderation policy \( m_i \) and the ad price \( p_i \). Profits are \( \Pi_i(a_i, m_i, p_i) = a_i p_i - C(m_i) \), where \( C(m_i) = cm_i^2/2 \)

Throughout the analysis, we maintain the same assumptions as in the baseline model and adapt those in (A1-A3) to the current context. Specifically, we assume that advertisers are distributed uniformly according to their outside options in \([0, 1]\). For tractability, we assume full market coverage on the user side and we capture heterogeneity among users in their preference for
either platform. We, therefore, assume that users are distributed uniformly on the Hotelling line and their location is indexed by \( y \).\(^{17}\) Therefore, the utility of a user located at \( y \) from joining platform \( i \) is given by 

\[
U_i(a_i, m_i, p_i) = u + \phi \theta (m_i) - \gamma a_i + T_i(\tau, y),
\]

with \( T_1(\tau, y) = -\frac{\tau y}{2} \) and \( T_2(\tau, y) = \frac{\tau y}{2} \), \( y \in \{y, \overline{y}\} \) and \( \overline{y} = -y \), the user relative preference for platform 2. This means that users are distributed symmetrically around zero.

We assume that expectations on the market participation level are fulfilled at equilibrium and focus on a symmetrical equilibrium. We relegate the technical details to the Appendix so that we can express the number of ads and users on each platform as a sole function of each platform’s moderation policy and price, i.e., \( a_i(m_i, m_j, p_i, p_j) \) and \( n_i(m_i, m_j, p_i, p_j) \). As in the baseline model, \( \frac{da_i}{dm_i} \) is critical in shaping platform \( i \) incentives to engage in moderation and the optimal pricing strategy:

\[
\frac{da_i(m_i, m_j, p_i, p_j)}{dm_i} = \frac{\lambda(2\tau + \gamma r - r\phi)}{2\tau},
\]

which can be either positive or negative. Importantly, if \( \phi < 0 \), users dislike unsafe content and \( \frac{da_i(m_i, m_j, p_i, p_j)}{dm_i} > 0 \). Therefore, a higher moderation intensity ensures higher brand safety and user participation, increasing advertisers’ participation in platform \( i \) (all else being equal).

Alternatively, if \( \phi > 0 \), users generate positive utility from unsafe content, which conflicts with advertisers’ preferences. In this case, the sign of \( \frac{da_i(m_i, m_j, p_i, p_j)}{dm_i} \) depends on the trade-off between the brand safety effect, now augmented for the intensity of platform competition for users (captured by \( \tau \)), and the eyeball effect. The eyeball effect is positive (respectively, negative) if, for a given nuisance, \( \tau \) is sufficiently large (respectively, small). Indeed, if competition for user attention grows fiercer, the user transportation cost \( \tau \) would decrease, and users, who enjoy unsafe content, would move to the rival platform (for a given rival’s moderation policy). Consequently, the number of advertisers that join the platform decreases. The opposite would hold if the competition between social media platforms were softened, meaning when facing an unwanted higher content moderation intensity, users would find it too costly to move to the rival platform. This would create an incentive for advertisers to keep advertising on the platform.

The following lemma presents the equilibrium content moderation policy and prices under the assumption of a uniform distribution of the opportunity costs.

**Lemma 2.** Consider social media platform competition. The platform sets the following content moderation policy and price:

(i) If \( \lambda \leq \frac{r\phi}{2\tau + \gamma r} \):

\[
m_i^* = 0 \quad p_i^* = \frac{(\tau + \gamma r)(r - 2\lambda)}{4\tau + 3\gamma r}.
\]

\(^{17}\)To ensure full market coverage, we assume that \( u \) is large enough.
(ii) If \( \frac{r\phi}{2r+\gamma r} < \lambda < \frac{2c(4\tau+3\gamma r)+\phi r^2}{r(2\tau+\gamma r)} \):

\[
m^*_i = \frac{(\lambda(2\tau + \gamma r) - r\phi)(r - 2\lambda)}{2(c(3\gamma r + 4\tau) - \lambda(2\tau + \gamma r) - r\phi)} \quad p^*_i = \frac{c(\tau + \gamma r)(r - 2\lambda)}{c(3\gamma r + 4\tau) - \lambda(2\tau + \gamma r) - r\phi}
\]

(7)

(ii) If \( \lambda \geq \frac{2c(4\tau+3\gamma r)+\phi r^2}{r(2\tau+\gamma r)} \):

\[
m^*_i = 1 \quad p^*_i = \frac{(\tau + \gamma r)r}{4\tau + 3\gamma r}.
\]

Competition for user attention creates incentives for platforms to attract users in a twofold manner: By increasing the ad price, the platform can control the number of ads on the platform; by changing moderation, the platform can control the direct effect of moderation in the two sides of the market. The competition for user attention now exacerbates the negative effect of an ad price on advertisers’ demand. In other words, having more ads also induces users to switch to another platform, which means fewer ads are present on the platform of origin, and thereby the profit of this platform decreases. Formally, this effect arises because the marginal gain from moderation and the incentives to invest in content moderation decrease.

**The effect of competition on platforms’ strategies.** In what follows, we identify how more intense competition between platforms affects the incentives to invest in content moderation. Here, we provide simple comparative statics to understand the effect of a change in the transportation cost. We restrict our attention to \( \frac{r\phi}{2r+\gamma r} < \lambda < \frac{2c(4\tau+3\gamma r)+\phi r^2}{r(2\tau+\gamma r)} \) that is when \( m^* \in (0, 1) \). Differentiating \( p^*_i \) and \( m^*_i \) with respect to \( \tau \), we obtain:

\[
\frac{\partial p^*_i}{\partial \tau} = \frac{cr(\lambda(\gamma + \phi) - c\gamma)(r - 2\lambda)}{(c(3\gamma r + 4\tau) - \lambda(2\tau + \gamma r) - r\phi))^2}
\]

\[
\frac{\partial m^*_i}{\partial \tau} = \frac{cr(2\phi + \gamma \lambda)(r - 2\lambda)}{(c(3\gamma r + 4\tau) - \lambda(2\tau + \gamma r) - r\phi))^2}
\]

The sign of \( \frac{\partial p^*_i}{\partial \tau} \) is the same as the sign of

\[
\frac{\lambda(\gamma + \phi) - c\gamma}{(-/+)} \quad (+)
\]

which is positive (respectively, negative) \( c \) is low (respectively, high) enough. Denoting \( \tilde{c}_{\text{comp}} \equiv \frac{\lambda(\gamma + \phi)}{\gamma} \), then \( \frac{\partial p^*_i}{\partial \tau} > (<)0 \) for any \( c < (>)\tilde{c}_{\text{comp}} \).

Moreover, the sign of \( \frac{\partial m^*_i}{\partial \tau} \) is the same as the sign of

\[
\frac{2\phi + \gamma \lambda}{(-/+)} \quad (+)
\]

The first term, capturing users’ preferences, is positive (respectively, negative) if users enjoy
(respectively, dislike) unsafe content. The second term relates to the interplay between the nuisance cost and the brand risk advertisers face. This captures the positive change in advertisers’ participation. A sufficient condition for \( \frac{\partial m^*_i}{\partial \tau} > 0 \) is that \( \phi > 0 \). In this case, reducing \( \tau \) (i.e., a fiercer competition) negatively affects the equilibrium content moderation.

Under congruent preferences, instead, there are opposing forces and the net effect is determined by the prevailing one. Therefore, a stronger competition for users leads to an increase (respectively, decrease) in content moderation intensity only if \( \phi \) is large enough (respectively, low enough), that is \( \frac{\lambda \gamma}{2} < (>) - \phi \). These results are summarized as follows:

**Proposition 7.** If competition between social media platforms becomes fiercer on the user side, the ad price \( p^*_i \) decreases (respectively, increases), if \( c \leq (>) \tilde{c}_{comp} \) whereas the content moderation intensity decreases (respectively, increases) if \( \frac{\lambda \gamma}{2} > (>) - \phi \).

Proposition 7 shows that when competition for users becomes fiercer, platforms use both the ad price and the content moderation intensity to attract users. The moderation effort directly affects users and advertisers, whereas the ad price indirectly affects users’ utility.

Suppose that users generate utility from unsafe content \( (\phi = \phi^+ > 0) \). When competition is fiercer, and \( c \) is relatively high, reducing advertising nuisance to attract users (hence increasing the ad price) appears cheaper than increasing the moderation intensity. If \( c \) is relatively low, using the content moderation policy is a relatively cheap instrument to attract users. However, increasing content moderation intensity for a given ad price would attract advertisers and generate advertising nuisance to users. Facing this trade-off, fiercer competition for user attention induces the platform to lower its content moderation intensity.

Suppose now that users dislike unsafe content and have congruent preferences with advertisers \( (\phi = \phi^- > 0) \). In this case, increasing content moderation gives users a direct utility from less unsafe content but an indirect disutility from seeing more advertisers attracted by a higher brand safety. Thus, as the competition between platforms increases, the platform balances those two effects and only increases its content moderation if the direct effect from unsafe content dominates the advertising nuisance created by more advertisers. Because of this, the platform is less likely to lower advertising nuisance to attract users, because increasing the moderation policy pleases both users and advertisers.

### 7 Extensions and Discussion

In this Section, we discuss possible extensions of our analysis. We relegate to the Appendix the presentation of technical details whenever present.
7.1 Taxing Digital Platforms

Taxing digital platforms for their activity is critical for policymakers. We, therefore, discuss the impact of two types of taxes: a tax on ad revenues and a tax on user activity on the platform.

**Taxing digital revenues.** Suppose that a fixed tax $f_a$ is imposed on ad revenues, such that the net profit of the platform is equal to $\Pi(a, m, p) = a(n, m, p)(p - f_a) - C(m)$. As intuition suggests, a similar tax directly affects the platform’s marginal revenues, reducing the marginal gains of attracting advertisers. Because $m^*$ is an increasing function of the marginal gains from moderation, the higher the tax, the lower the marginal gains from moderation and, consequently, the lower the incentive to moderate unsafe content. Notably, this effect is independent of whether users and advertisers have congruent or conflicting tastes for moderation.

The effect on the ad price is more subtle. A first-order effect does drive up the ad price. But there is a second-order effect for which the ad price reduction complements a reduction in the platform’s moderation effort. Depending on the prevailing effect, the ad price may increase or decrease. As we formally show in the Appendix, there is a critical value of the moderation costs below which advertisers are granted a price discount to compensate for the high brand risk and above which advertisers pay a higher price when an ad tax is introduced.

Note that reduced content moderation leads to more unsafe content and negatively affects advertisers’ participation levels. Users are likelier to be better off unless they derive a large utility from the moderation of unsafe content. In the latter case, the gains from a lower ad nuisance are fully offset by the distress of being exposed to unsafe content.

**Taxing platform activity.** An alternative form of taxation concerns data collection (Collin and Colin, 2013). For tractability, suppose users are homogeneous in their activity only, so taxing data collection is equivalent to imposing a tax per user. Denote such a tax by $f_n$, such that the net profit of the platform is equal to $\Pi(a, m, p) = a(n, m, p)p - C(m) - n(a, m)f_n$. Mirroring what was previously discussed, a tax based on user activity implies that attracting users becomes more expensive, which might create a bias in the platform’s strategy towards advertisers. In turn, the larger the tax, the larger the distortion introduced, and the larger the incentive for the platform to invest in content moderation. However, this mechanism breaks down when users have congruent tastes for moderation and derive a large utility from removing unsafe content. In the latter case, more stringent content moderation would attract a large mass of users, thereby increasing the user base for which the platform is subject to a tax.

Turning on the ad price, the tax pass-through is not always fully present at equilibrium. With a lower ad price, more advertisers can join the platform. Because users face a higher nuisance, their participation decreases, as does the negative effect of the tax on the platform’s profits. Yet, as content moderation increases, so, too, may advertisers’ willingness to pay, which would mean the platform could set a high ad price. Depending on the prevailing effect, which is
linked to the size of the moderation cost, the ad price decreases for high moderation costs and increases otherwise. It follows that users and advertisers can be better or worse off if such a tax is imposed depending on the usual trade-off between nuisance from (more or less) ads and user preferences for more or less moderation.

7.2 Targeting

Platform(s) can operate content moderation on a case-by-case basis. Although a complete analysis of targeting and matching is beyond the scope of this paper, targeting can potentially emerge in our framework. Suppose the platform can provide better matching between advertisers and content. For example, advertisers can create lists of keywords they either want or do not want to be associated with. According to IAS Insider, the keywords most often blocked by advertisers in November 2019 included “shooting, explosion, dead, bombs, etc”\textsuperscript{18}. This may safeguard brands and marketers. Because targeting is far from perfect (Nielsen, 2018), and better precision requires investment costs that are similar to the one used in our model, the main trade-off between the eyeball effect and the brand safety effect is likely to remain unchanged.

7.3 Other Applications

Our setting can offer insights into content moderation policies in other industries. We lay out several examples in this subsection.

**Offline news outlets.** Consider a (traditional) media outlet, which is characterized by an editor and an editorial board. These outlets, therefore, have almost full control over the type of content they display. Such a practice differs from platforms that do not control content production. However, even professional content can feature a divergence between the interests of the users and those of the advertisers (see e.g., Ellman and Germano 2009). For instance, in September 2016, following the online campaign “Stop Funding Hate” related to the presence of disputed content on migrants, advertisers such as The Body Shop, Plusnet, Walkers, and others announced they would stop advertising on *The Daily Mail* and *The Sun*. Such a story fits the trade-off that traditional media outlets may face when producing or reporting potentially controversial content.

**Other ad-funded news outlets.** An ad-funded news outlet that only produces professional content but is sufficiently attention-grabbing to attract users can represent another example. In this case, the outlet might strategically choose the sensitivity of content to produce to balance

\textsuperscript{18}See IAS Insider.
user and advertiser preferences. Whereas investments in content moderation might not be required, content production may still be costly. The more professional the content, the higher the cost, and the safer it can be for advertisers. However, one may imagine that producing professional content is cheaper than moderating thousands of online user-generated content pieces.

**Content aggregators.** Content aggregators host both first-party (i.e., professional content) and user-generated content. An ad-funded content aggregator will choose the share of professional and user-generated content depending on users’ and advertisers’ preferences. This is akin to the trade-off that the social media platform in our analysis faces if, for example, one considers that professional content is more costly to produce, advertisers prefer more professional content. In contrast, users might have a preference for or an aversion to the user-generated one.

**TV shows.** We can also apply OUR framework to TV reality shows, such as the famous *The Big Brother*. Frequently, shows like these are sponsored by advertisers and feature a group of contestants. Although viewers might like houseguest scandals, which keep the reality game alive year after year, advertisers that sponsor the program with their products might not appreciate them. In Italy, in 2018, several different sponsors, including Nintendo, decided to forfeit their partnership with the TV show after it showed bullying in the house.\(^{19}\) Something similar occurred in France, with advertisers boycotting a TV show because of sensitive content.\(^{20}\) Indeed, media producers must balance potentially conflicting preferences for borderline (though viral) content and decide how to moderate what is shown on TV.

### 8 Main highlights and conclusions

The digital revolution has changed the production of media content. Some of the content, though viral, can be toxic or unsafe. In this article, we study the trade-off faced by advertisers who suffer brand safety issues from the spread of unsafe content and the platform’s incentives to curb their online presence. In this section, we summarize the main results identifying critical implications both for managers of brands and media agencies and for policymakers.

**Managerial implications.** First and foremost, we identify conditions for a platform to invest in costly content moderation. We show that the platform might not invest in content moderation. This case arises only if a) users strongly prefer unsafe content and b) advertisers’ losses

\(^{19}\)Blitzquotidiano.com, May 4, 2018, 'Grande Fratello, la grande fuga degli sponsor: niente acqua, shampoo e Nintendo’

\(^{20}\)LEpress.fr. October 10, 2019
from the presence of unsafe content are limited. In all other cases, the platform has an incentive to curb unsafe content, although there is a partial content moderation intensity. Our analysis suggests that social media managers should carefully assess the extent to which advertisers’ and users’ preferences are aligned. Although moderating unsafe content has a positive direct brand safety effect for advertisers, it might repel participation by users that like unsafe content. The Tumblr case provides suggestive evidence about the divergence of preferences across sides of the market and how failing to account for them can lead to the destruction of the user base. For the microblogging platform, the change in the moderation policy, motivated by the aim to ensure a brand-safe environment for advertisers, triggered the exit of many content creators and viewers, thus reducing the value of the platform.

Second, social media platforms should pay particular attention to factors that can increase (or reduce) brands’ sensitivity to unsafe content, as it would affect advertisers’ willingness to pay differently. Due to the responsiveness of users to content moderation and advertising, our analysis shows that it may not always be optimal for the platform to raise the intensity of content moderation if advertisers become more sensitive to the presence of unsafe content. This might help explain why advertisers are not always satisfied with social media platforms’ moderation strategies and have started boycotting large platforms.

Third, moderation costs also matter and can affect asymmetrically different platforms, thereby providing a further answer to why content moderation policies differ. For example, in its moderation report, Facebook states that moderation costs are idiosyncratic to countries, depending on language, culture, and other characteristics. Language barriers are likely to increase moderation costs because AI moderators might not be able to deal with certain spoken languages or regional dialects.

**Policy implications.** Our analysis suggests that policymakers might be subject to a trade-off between pleasing advertisers or users if mandating stricter content moderation policies.

A fully-fledged welfare analysis requires looking in-depth at what we call unsafe content. Our analysis suggests that when where users would prefer the removal of unsafe content, their surplus might decrease because of the increase in the number of ads.

Moreover, our analysis identifies a potential trade-off between stimulating competition between social media platforms and guaranteeing a safer social media environment. It shows that a social media platform might lower its content moderation intensity in response to a fiercer...

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22See BusinessInsider, September 16, 2021 ‘Facebook’s AI moderation reportedly can’t interpret many languages, leaving users in some countries more susceptible to harmful posts’.

23For a discussion on the economic effects of liability for online intermediaries, including social media platforms, see Lefouili and Madio (2022).
platform competition for user attention. This would strike with the policy goal of having a safe web and, yet simultaneously, it might hurt advertisers.

We studied the impact of a digital tax on the platform’s incentives to curb unsafe content. We showed that any tax alters platform incentives and induces a more or less intensive content moderation depending on how the tax is designed. A tax on user activity would induce more moderation, whereas a tax on ad revenues would induce a lax approach. Moreover, a tax might not necessarily translate into a higher price for advertisers. Indeed, our analysis suggests that particular attention should be placed on the interplay between content moderation policies, pricing strategies, and public policies.

References


Appendix

Proof of Lemma 1

The proof immediately follows from the discussion in the main text.

Proof of Proposition 1

The first part of the proof follows immediately from the fact that \( m^* = 0 \) if \( \frac{\partial \Pi(m, p)}{\partial m} \bigg|_{m=0} = 0 \).

Because \( C'(0) = 0 \), then \( \frac{\partial \Pi(m, p)}{\partial m} \bigg|_{m=0} < 0 \) if \( \frac{dH(\cdot)}{dm} \bigg|_{m=0} < 0 \), which is the case if \( \lambda < rf(\cdot)\phi \).

The second part of the proof determines \( m^* \in (0, 1) \) as the solution to

\[
\frac{\partial \Pi(m^*, p)}{\partial m} = 0 : \quad \frac{dH(\cdot)}{dm} - C'(m^*) = 0.
\]

This completes the proof.

Proof of Corollary 1

Under (A1-A3), we write the participation level on the two sides of the market as

\[
a(n, m, p) = rn(a, m) - \lambda(1 - m) - p
\]

\[
n(a, m) = v + \phi(1 - m) - \gamma a(n, m, p)
\]

Solving for fulfilled expectations, we write the participation level on each side of the market as a sole function of \( \{m, p\} \) as

\[
a(m, p) = \frac{ru - p - (1 - m)(\lambda - r\phi)}{1 + \gamma r}
\]

Therefore, the platform profit is

\[
\Pi(m, p) = a(m, p)p - C(m) = p \times \frac{ru - p - (1 - m)(\lambda - r\phi)}{1 + \gamma r} - \frac{cm^2}{2}, \tag{8}
\]

which is concave in both arguments under (A2) as

\[
\frac{\partial^2 \Pi(m, p)}{\partial p^2} \frac{\partial^2 \Pi(m, p)}{\partial^2 m^2} - \left( \frac{\partial^2 \Pi(m, p)}{\partial m \partial p} \right)^2 = 2c(\gamma r + 1) - \frac{(\lambda - r\phi)^2}{(r \gamma + 1)^2} > 0.
\]

Moreover, \( \frac{\partial^2 \Pi(m, p)}{\partial p^2} = -\frac{2}{\gamma r + 1} < 0 \) and \( \frac{\partial^2 \Pi(m, p)}{\partial m^2} = -c < 0. \)
Differentiating the platform’s profit with respect to \( p \) and \( m \) yields

\[
\frac{\partial \Pi(m, p)}{\partial m} = \frac{p(\lambda - r\phi)}{\gamma r + 1} - cm = 0
\]

\[
\frac{\partial \Pi(m, p)}{\partial p} = \frac{ru - (1 - m)(\lambda - r\phi) - p}{\gamma r + 1} - \frac{p}{\gamma r + 1} = 0
\]

Solving simultaneously, we obtain

\[
m^* = \frac{(\lambda - r\phi)(r(u + \phi) - \lambda)}{2c(\gamma r + 1) - (\lambda - r\phi)^2} \in (0, 1)
p^*|_{m^* \in (0, 1)} = \frac{c(\gamma r + 1)(r(u + \phi) - \lambda)}{2c(\gamma r + 1) - (\lambda - r\phi)^2},
\]

Note that the first-order condition with respect to \( m \) is negative at \( m = 0 \) if \( \lambda < r\phi \), which implies that \( m^* = 1 \). In this case, the optimal price is

\[
p^*|_{m = 0} = \frac{r(u + \phi) - \lambda}{2}
\]

Moreover, \( m = 1 \) occurs if \( \lambda \geq \phi r + \frac{2c(\gamma r + 1)}{ru} \). In this case, \( m^* = 1 \) and the optimal price is

\[
p^*|_{m = 1} = \frac{ru}{2}.
\]

**Proof of Proposition 2**

In what follows, we study the impact of \( \lambda \) on the equilibrium outcomes. Differentiating \( p^* \) and \( m^* \) with respect to \( \lambda \), in the parameter ranges in which \( m^* \in (0, 1) \) yields the following:

\[
\frac{\partial p^*}{\partial \lambda} = -\frac{c(\gamma r + 1)(2c(\gamma r + 1) + (\lambda - r\phi)^2 - (\lambda - r\phi)2ru)}{(2c(\gamma r + 1) - (\lambda - r\phi)^2)^2}
\]

\[
\frac{\partial m^*}{\partial \lambda} = \frac{ru(2c(\gamma r + 1) + (\lambda - r\phi)^2) - 4c(\gamma r + 1)(\lambda - r\phi)}{(2c(\gamma r + 1) - (\lambda - r\phi)^2)^2}
\]

Note that \( \frac{\partial p^*}{\partial \lambda} = 0 \), which is the case for \( \lambda = \lambda_1 \) and \( \lambda = \lambda_2 \), with

\[
\lambda_1 = r(u + \phi) - \sqrt{(ru)^2 - 2c(\gamma r + 1)}
\]

\[
\lambda_2 = r(u + \phi) + \sqrt{(ru)^2 - 2c(\gamma r + 1)}
\]

However, only \( \lambda_1 \) is feasible, which we denote as \( \lambda_p \). Note that \( \lambda_p \) only exists if \( c < \frac{(ur)^2}{2(\gamma r + 1)} \).

Moreover, as \( \frac{\partial^2 p^*}{\partial \lambda^2} \big|_{\lambda = \lambda_p} > 0 \) meaning that \( p^* \) is convex in \( \lambda \). If \( c > \frac{(ur)^2}{2(\gamma r + 1)} \), instead, then \( p^* \) always decreasing in \( \lambda \)

\[
\frac{\partial p^*}{\partial \lambda} < 0.
\]

Note that \( \frac{\partial m^*}{\partial \lambda} = 0 \) which is the case for

\[
\lambda_1 = \frac{\phi ur^2 + 2c(\gamma r + 1) - \sqrt{2\sqrt{c(\gamma r + 1)(2c(\gamma r + 1) - (ru)^2)}}}{ru}
\]
\[
\lambda_2 = \frac{\phi ur^2 + 2c(\gamma r + 1) + \sqrt{2}\sqrt{c(\gamma r + 1)(2c(\gamma r + 1) - (ru)^2)}}{ru}.
\]

However, only \(\lambda_1\) satisfies our constrains. Denoting it as \(\lambda_m\), we find that it exists only if \(c > \frac{(ur)^2}{2(\gamma r + 1)}\). Moreover, as \(\frac{\partial^2 m^*}{\partial \lambda^2}\big|_{\lambda=\lambda_m} < 0\), \(m^*\) is concave in \(\lambda\). If \(c < \frac{(ur)^2}{2(\gamma r + 1)}\), we find \(m^*\) is always increasing in \(\lambda\).

**Proof of Proposition 3**

The proof immediately follows from the discussion in the main text.

**Proof of Proposition 4**

The proof immediately follows from the discussion in the main text.

**Proof of Proposition 5**

The proof immediately follows from the discussion in the main text.

**Proof of Proposition 6**

The first part of the proof follows immediately from the discussion in the text and (5).

The second part of the proof follows. First note that

\[
\Pi(\hat{m} = 1) - \Pi(\hat{m} = 0) = \left[ p^*a(1, p^*) \right]_{m=1} - C(1) - \left[ p^*a(1, p^*) \right]_{m=0} - C(0).
\]

Because \(C(0) = 0\) by assumption and \(\frac{dp^*}{dm} > 0\) and \(\frac{dp^*(m, p^*)}{dm} > 0\), it follows that

\[
\Pi(\hat{m} = 1) - \Pi(\hat{m} = 0) > 0 \iff C(1) \leq \left[ p^*a(1, p^*) \right]_{m=1} - \left[ p^*a(1, p^*) \right]_{m=0}
\]

which, with the uniform distribution, implies the following:

\[
\Pi(\hat{m} = 1) - \Pi(\hat{m} = 0) > 0 \quad \text{if} \quad c < \frac{(\lambda - \phi r)(2ru - (\lambda - \phi r))}{2(1 + \gamma r)}.
\]

**Proof of Lemma 2**

Consider the case of platform competition. Users’ demand is denoted by

\[
n_i(a_i, a_j, m_i, m_j) = \frac{\tau + (m_j - m_i)\phi + (a_j - a_i)\gamma}{2\tau} \quad \text{and} \quad n_j(a_j, a_i, m_j, m_i) = 1 - n_i(a_i, a_j, m_i, m_j).
\]

(9)
of the associated system of equations yields users’ and advertisers’ participation as a sole function of $(m_i, m_j, p_i, p_j)$. We assume that advertisers and users form expectations that are fulfilled at equilibrium. Solving for ease of exposition, we drop the arguments $(m_i, m_j, p_i, p_j)$.

$$n_i(m_i, m_j, p_i, p_j) = \frac{(m_j - m_i)(\gamma \lambda + \phi + \tau + \gamma r + \gamma (p_i - p_j)}{2(\tau + \gamma r)}$$

$$n_j(m_j, m_i, p_i, p_j) = 1 - n_i(m_i, m_j, p_i, p_j)$$

$$a_i(m_i, m_j, p_i, p_j) = \frac{(2\tau(m_i - 1) + (\gamma(m_j + m_i - 2))r \lambda + r(\tau + \phi(m_j - m_i) - \gamma(p_j + p_i) - 2p_i \tau + \gamma r^2)}{2(\tau + \gamma r)}$$

$$a_j(m_j, m_i, p_i, p_j) = \frac{(2\tau(m_j - 1) + (\gamma(m_j + m_i - 2))r \lambda + r(\tau + \phi(m_i - m_j) - \gamma(p_j + p_i) - 2p_j \tau + \gamma r^2)}{2(\tau + \gamma r)}$$

For ease of exposition, we drop the arguments $(m_i, m_j, p_i, p_j)$. The platforms’ profits are

$$\Pi_i(\cdot) = p_i \times \frac{(2\tau(m_i - 1) + (\gamma(m_j + m_i - 2))r \lambda + r(\tau + \phi(m_j - m_i) - \gamma(p_j + p_i) - 2p_i \tau + \gamma r^2)}{2(\tau + \gamma r)} - \frac{cm_i^2}{2}$$

$$\Pi_j(\cdot) = p_j \times \frac{(2\tau(m_j - 1) + (\gamma(m_j + m_i - 2))r \lambda + r(\tau + \phi(m_i - m_j) - \gamma(p_j + p_i) - 2p_j \tau + \gamma r^2)}{2(\tau + \gamma r)} - \frac{cm_j^2}{2}$$

which are concave in both arguments under the assumption that $c > \frac{(2\tau + \gamma r)\lambda - \phi \tau}{4(2\tau + \gamma r)(\tau + \gamma r)}$.

From the first-order condition of the platform’s profit with respect to $p$ and $m$ we obtain respectively

$$\frac{\partial \Pi_i(\cdot)}{\partial m_i} = 2p_i \tau \lambda + \gamma p_i r \lambda 2m_i c_r - p_i \phi r - 2m_i c_r \gamma r - cm_i = 0$$

$$\frac{\partial \Pi_i(\cdot)}{\partial p_i} = \frac{((2m_i - 2)\tau + (m_j + m_i - 2)\gamma r) \lambda + (r - 4p_i) \tau + \gamma r^2 + ((m_j - m_i) \phi - \gamma p_j - 2\gamma p_i) r}{2(\gamma r + \tau)} = 0$$

$$\frac{\partial \Pi_j(\cdot)}{\partial m_j} = \frac{2p_j \tau \lambda + \gamma p_j r \lambda 2m_j c_r - p_j \phi r - 2m_j c_r \gamma r - cm_j = 0}{2(\gamma r + \tau)}$$

$$\frac{\partial \Pi_j(\cdot)}{\partial p_j} = \frac{((2m_j - 2)\tau + (m_j + m_i - 2)\gamma r) \lambda + (r - 4p_j) \tau + \gamma r^2 + ((m_i - m_j) \phi - \gamma p_i - 2\gamma p_j) r}{2(\gamma r + \tau)} = 0$$

Note that

$$\frac{\partial^2 \Pi_i(\cdot)}{\partial p_i^2} = \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_i(\cdot)}{\partial m_i^2} = \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_i(\cdot)}{\partial m_i \partial p_i} = \frac{(\partial^2 \Pi_i(\cdot))^2}{4(\tau + \gamma r)^2} > 0$$

$$\frac{\partial^2 \Pi_j(\cdot)}{\partial p_j^2} = \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_j(\cdot)}{\partial m_j^2} = \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_j(\cdot)}{\partial m_j \partial p_j} = \frac{(\partial^2 \Pi_j(\cdot))^2}{4(\tau + \gamma r)^2} > 0.$$
Solving simultaneously, we obtain the following solutions

\[ m^*_i = m^*_j = \frac{(\lambda(2\tau + \gamma r) - r\phi)(r - 2\lambda)}{2(c(3\gamma r + 4\tau) - \lambda(2\tau + \gamma r) - r\phi)} \in (0, 1) \]

\[ p^*_i = p^*_j = \frac{c(\tau + \gamma r)(r - 2\lambda)}{c(3\gamma r + 4\tau) - \lambda(2\tau + \gamma r) - r\phi} \]

Note that \( m^*_i = m^*_j = 0 \) if \( \lambda < \frac{r\phi}{2\tau + \gamma r} \). In this case, the optimal price is

\[ p^*_i = p^*_j = \frac{(r - 2\lambda)(\tau + \gamma r)}{4\tau + 3\gamma r} \]

Moreover, \( m^* = 1 \) if \( \lambda \geq \frac{2c(4\tau + 3\gamma r) + \phi r^2}{r(2\tau + \gamma r)} \). In this case, the optimal price is

\[ p^*_j = p^*_j = \frac{r(\tau + \gamma r)}{4\tau + 3\gamma r} . \]

**Proof of Proposition 7**

The proof immediately follows from the discussion in the main text.

**Proof of Section 7**

This section formally proves statements made in Section 7. We first consider the effect of a tax on digital revenues on the platform’s strategies. Then, we consider the effect of a tax levied based on user activity on the platform’s strategies.

**Tax on Digital Revenues**

Let us denote \( f^a < p^* \) the tax levied on the platform’s advertising revenues so that the government can raise as much as \( af^a \). We assume that the amount of the tax is exogenously given. The net profit of the platform is equal to \( \Pi(m, p) = a(n, m, p)(p - f^a) - C(m) \). Therefore, the analysis in Section 4 carries over with the appropriate changes. Differentiating the profit with respect to \( m \) and \( p \) and solving the system of equations yields the optimal price and (interior) content moderation policy, respectively.

\[ p^* = \frac{c(1 + \gamma r)(r(1 + \phi) - \lambda) + f^a(c(1 + \gamma r) - (\lambda - \phi r)^2)}{2c(1 + \gamma r) - (\lambda - \phi r)^2} \]

\[ m^* = \frac{(\lambda - r\phi)(r(1 + \phi) - \lambda - f^a)}{2c(\gamma r + 1) - (\lambda - r\phi)^2} , \]
Differentiating $p^*$ and $m^*$ with respect to $f^a$ yields

$$
\frac{\partial p^*}{\partial f^a} = \frac{c(1 + \gamma r) - (\lambda - \phi r)^2}{2c(1 + \gamma r) - (\lambda - \phi r)^2},
\frac{\partial m^*}{\partial f^a} = -\frac{\lambda - \phi r}{2c(1 + \gamma r) - (\lambda - \phi r)^2}.
$$

Note that $\frac{\partial m^*}{\partial f^a} < 0$ always for any interior solution $\lambda > \phi r$. The sign of $\frac{\partial p^*}{\partial f^a}$ is the same as the sign of its numerator, which is positive (respectively, negative) if $c > (\phi > 0)$ and $\lambda > \phi r > 0$ to ensure that $m^* \in (0, 1)$. If $\phi < 0$, the effect is positive (respectively, negative) if $c > (\phi > 0)$ and $\lambda > \phi r > 0$.

To understand the effect of the tax on advertisers’ demand (and surplus, by revealed preferences), let us differentiate $a(m^*, p^*)$ with respect to $f^a$, which yields

$$
\frac{da(m^*, p^*)}{df^a} = -\frac{c}{2c(1 + \gamma r) - (\lambda - \phi r)^2} < 0,
$$

Consider now the user demand $n(m^*, p^*)$. Differentiating it with respect to $f^a$ yields

$$
\frac{dn(m^*, p^*)}{df^a} = \frac{c\gamma + \phi(\lambda - \phi r)}{2c(1 + \gamma r) - (\lambda - \phi r)^2}
$$

which has the sign as $\gamma + \phi(\lambda - \phi r)$. A sufficient condition for $\frac{\partial n(m^*, p^*)}{\partial f^a} > 0$ is that $\phi > 0$ as $\lambda - \phi r > 0$ to ensure that $m^* \in (0, 1)$. If $\phi < 0$, the effect is positive (respectively, negative) if $c > (\phi > 0)$ and $\lambda - \phi r > 0$.

### Tax on the User Activity

Let us denote $f^a$ a tax levied on the platform for each user who joins the service. The net profit of the platform is changed $\Pi(m, p) = a(n, m, p)p - C(m) - n(a, m)f^a$. With the appropriate changes, differentiating the profit with respect to $m$ and $p$ and solving the system of equations yields the optimal price and (interior) content moderation policy, respectively

$$
p^* = \frac{c(1 + \gamma r)(ru - (\lambda - \phi r)) + f^a((\gamma \lambda + \phi)(\lambda - \phi r) - c\gamma(1 + \gamma r))}{2c(1 + \gamma r) - (\lambda - \phi r)^2},
m^* = \frac{(\lambda - \phi r)(ru - (\lambda - \phi r)) + f^a(\gamma(\lambda + \phi r) + 2\phi)}{2c(1 + \gamma r) - (\lambda - \phi r)^2}.
$$

Differentiating $p^*$ and $m^*$ with respect to $f^a$ yields

$$
\frac{\partial p^*}{\partial f^a} = \frac{(\gamma \lambda + \phi)(\lambda - \phi r) - c\gamma(1 + \gamma r)}{2c(1 + \gamma r) - (\lambda - \phi r)^2},
\frac{\partial m^*}{\partial f^a} = \frac{\gamma(\lambda + \phi r) + 2\phi}{2c(1 + \gamma r) - (\lambda - \phi r)^2}.
$$

First, $\frac{\partial p^*}{\partial f^a} > (\phi > 0)$ if its numerator is positive (respectively, negative), that is if $c < (\phi > 0)$ and $\lambda - \phi r > 0$.

Second, $\frac{\partial m^*}{\partial f^a}$ has the same sign as its numerator. A sufficient condition for $\frac{\partial m^*}{\partial f^a} > 0$ is that $\lambda + \phi r > 0$. If $\phi < 0$, two opposite effects exists and $\frac{\partial m^*}{\partial f^a} > (\phi > 0)$. If $\gamma(\lambda + \phi r) + 2\phi > (\phi > 0)$
To understand the effect of the tax on advertisers’ demand and, by revealed preferences, surplus, let us differentiate $a(m^*, p^*)$ with respect to $f^n$, which yields

$$\frac{da(m^*, p^*)}{df^n} = \frac{c\gamma + \phi(\lambda - \phi r)}{2c(1 + \gamma r) - (\lambda - \phi r)^2}.$$

A sufficient condition for $\frac{da(m^*, p^*)}{df^n} > 0$ is that $\phi > 0$. If $\phi < 0$, then there are two opposite effects and $\frac{da(m^*, p^*)}{df^n} > (\ <) 0$ if $c\gamma + \phi(\lambda - \phi r) > (\ <) 0$.

Consider now the user demand $n(m^*, p^*)$. Differentiating it with respect to $f^n$ yields

$$\frac{dn}{df^n} = -\frac{c\gamma^2 + 2\phi(\gamma \lambda + \phi)}{2c(1 + \gamma r) - (\lambda - \phi r)^2}.$$

A sufficient condition for $\frac{da(m^*, p^*)}{df^n} < 0$ is that $\phi > 0$. If $\phi < 0$, then there are two opposite effects and $\frac{da(m^*, p^*)}{df^n} < (\ >) 0$ if $c\gamma^2 + 2\phi(\gamma \lambda + \phi) > (\ <) 0$.

This concludes the proof.